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COMMERCIAL TORTS AND DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES
by
Lyman G. Hughes* and Tim Gavin**
I. COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
A. Antitrust
HE first case under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of
1983 (TFEAA)1 to reach the appellate courts was reported during
the survey period. In State v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.2 the state
sought to divest a bottling company of assets purchased from another bot-
tling company. In the trial court the defendants urged by special exceptions
that the TFEAA violated the supremacy 3 and commerce 4 clauses of the
United States Constitution. The trial court sustained the exceptions.
On appeal the court first considered the argument that the supremacy
clause preempted the TFEAA because the merger and acquisition restric-
tions of the Act conflict with the Clayton Act 5 and the Soft Drink Inter-
brand Competition Act.6 The court held that although the state statute may
have incidental effects on interstate commerce, if the statute is regulated
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local interest, the supremacy clause
will not preempt the statute.7 The court further held that the TFEAA met
this test.8 The court then noted that both the Soft Drink Act and the
TFEAA look to the same question of whether the product involved is in
effective competition with other products of the same general class in the
relevant geographic market. The court thus held that the statute does not
conflict with either the Clayton Act or the Soft Drink Act and accordingly
concluded that the supremacy clause did not render the TFEAA
* B.A., Kansas State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., St. Edward's University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-17.826 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
2. 697 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
3. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1983).
6. Id. §§ 3501-3503.




The court similarly rejected the defendants' arguments that the TFEAA
violates the commerce clause because it affects interstate commerce. The
court held that absent a specific showing of a clearly excessive burden on
interstate commerce or a demonstrable effect on the interstate flow of goods,
the court could only conclude that the TFEAA "has a rational relationship
to a legitimate State interest, i.e., the maintenance and promotion of eco-
nomic competition in trade and commerce occurring wholly or partly within
the state."' 0 The court concluded that no showing of an excessive burden on
interstate commerce existed in the present case and, therefore, that the trial
court had erroneously held the TFEAA unconstitutional."
The constitutional issues presented in the Coca Cola Bottling case will
arise frequently in cases involving claims under the TFEAA. Accordingly,
the court's opinion is an important one and merits a close look. Two points
seem particularly noteworthy. First, two of the three judges on the panel
that decided Coca Cola Bottling joined in the concurring opinion of Judge
Cadena,12 which urged that because the TFEAA is not unconstitutional on
its face, the court should make no "sweeping declarations concerning the
validity of the statute in the absence of evidence establishing the effect of the
challenged transaction as applied to the facts of this case.' 1 3 Consequently,
the majority of the panel supported the reversal of the trial court judgment
on the sole ground that the determination of the constitutional issues should
be made upon an evidentiary record rather than upon special exceptions.
Second, the court's reasoning with respect to whether the TFEAA is pre-
empted by the Soft Drink Act is perhaps unsound. That Act expressly
preempts the antitrust laws with respect to transactions to which the Act
applies. 14 The antitrust laws include the Sherman Act, 15 the Clayton Act, 16
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 7 Since the legislature expressly
intended the TFEAA to mirror these federal acts,' 8 the conclusion more
properly should be that the Soft Drink Act also preempts the TFEAA.
More broadly speaking, whenever Congress has expressly preempted the fed-
9. Id. at 681.
10. Id. at 682.
11. Id. The court did not discuss § 15.25(b) of the TFEAA, which appears to be an
attempt by the legislature to address the constitutional issue. That section provides:
No suit under this Act shall be barred on the grounds that the activity or con-
duct complained of in any way affects or involves interstate or foreign com-
merce. It is the intent of the legislature to exercise its powers to the full extent
consistent with the constitutions of the State of Texas and the United States.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.25(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The constitutional issue is
not a subject for the legislature, however, and the legislature should never have included this
section in the TFEAA. The court properly ignored § 15.25(b) in Coca Cola Bottling.
12. 697 S.W.2d at 683.
13. Id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 3501 (Vernon 1983).
15. Id. §§ 1-11.
16. Id. §§ 12-31.
17. Id. §§ 41-58.
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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eral antitrust laws, the courts should also find the TFEAA impliedly
preempted.
B. Trade Names and Trade Secrets
The extent of protection provided to a trade name was the focus of the
Fifth Circuit decision in Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc.19 Like
all cases of this nature, the particular facts of the case determined its out-
come. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit opinion merits review for its discus-
sion of the effect of laches 20 as well as its consideration of secondary
meaning. 21
Although the appellate court modified and affirmed a temporary injunc-
tion in Keystone Life Insurance Co. v. Marketing Management, Inc.,22 the
court declined to address a significant question concerning the protection
accorded to customer lists provided by one party to another when the two
parties engage in a common enterprise. The agreement between the parties
contained no restriction on the use of information provided by one party to
the other, and the agreement defined both parties as independent contrac-
tors. The defendant accordingly argued that the plaintiff could show no
probable right of recovery based on the defendant's use of the plaintiffs cus-
tomer list after the termination of the common enterprise. The plaintiff ar-
gued that the defendant's action in using the customer information was a
breach of the good faith required in the performance of the contract. More
importantly, the plaintiff argued that recovery for misappropriation of confi-
dential information does not depend upon contractually imposed duties or
upon an express confidential relationship, but rather that the right of recov-
ery flows from the mere fact that a confidence has been extended.
The appellate court passed this "difficult question" back to the trial court
for initial determination, but found a sufficient showing of at least a "prob-
able right of recovery" to support the issuance of a temporary injunction. 23
The dissent would find no showing of a probable right of recovery for the use
of a customer list where there existed no contractual limitations on the par-
ties, no confidential relationship between the parties, no evidence that the
customer list was treated as confidential, and no evidence that the plaintiff
had directed the defendant to maintain the list as confidential. 24
II. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
A. Definition of Consumer
Numerous decisions of the Texas Supreme Court and various courts of
appeals addressed the issue of who qualifies as a consumer with standing to
19. 752 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1985).
20. Laches or acquiescence in the use of the trade name in one location would not pre-
clude injunctive relief against use of the name in another locale. Id. at 152-53.
21. Id. at 155.
22. 687 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
23. Id. at 92.
24. Id. at 94 (Guillot, J., dissenting).
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bring suit under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act (DTPA).25 Four years ago in Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc.26 the
Texas Supreme Court established the general principles applicable in deter-
mining whether a party qualifies as a consumer. In that case the court estab-
lished a two-prong test. First, the party must seek or acquire, by purchase
or lease, goods or services.27 Second, the goods or services sought or ac-
quired by lease or purchase must form the basis of the party's complaint.28
In Chastain v. Koonce29 the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that Cam-
eron provides the controlling test in determining consumer status, but the
court had to stretch the second prong in order to find that the plaintiffs
satisfied this test. The plaintiffs in Chastain purchased lots for the construc-
tion of personal residences. In so doing, the plaintiffs relied upon the sellers'
representations that purchasers of the remaining lots in the tract would use
the lots strictly for residential purposes. After the plaintiffs completed their
purchases, the sellers conveyed one of the remaining lots to a third party,
who built an oil field pipe storage yard on his lot. In determining whether
the plaintiffs satisfied the elements of the Cameron test, the court had no
difficulty in finding the first prong of the test satisfied. 30 The court had to be
creative, however, to find that the plaintiffs fulfilled the second requirement.
The plaintiffs had no complaint regarding the qualities of the lots they had
purchased, but instead complained about the use made of a nearby lot. Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' complaint was related to a
feature of the lots they obtained. The court noted that the defendants "made
representations calculated to induce these purchasers to buy the lots and
which enhanced the desirability of the property. Thus, the purchasers were
complaining about an aspect of the lots purchased and the transaction in-
volved."' 31 The court further buttressed its conclusion by citing the floor de-
bate in the Texas Senate, wherein a speaker cited as a specific example of a
DTPA violation a promise to erect a shopping center with no intent to fol-
low through on the promise. 32
25. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
26. 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981).
27. The first part basically restates verbatim the definition of consumer contained within
the DTPA itself. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
28. 618 S.W.2d at 539.
29. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 79 (Nov. 27, 1985).
30. Id. at 80.
31. Id. at 81. Similarly, in William P. Terrell, Inc. v. Miller, 697 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ), the court stretched the second part of the Cameron test in
order to find that the plaintiff had standing to pursue a DTPA claim. The plaintiffs in that
case purchased a home from the defendant builder and brought suit, claiming that the builder
had refused to pay for points and had refused to provide electrical fixtures at cost. The plain-
tiffs clearly had acquired a "good" in purchasing the home, but had no complaint regarding
the home itself. Instead, the plaintiffs' complaint centered on these two collateral agreements
allegedly made by the builder. Nevertheless, since these complaints pertained to the cost of the
good purchased, the court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to bring a
DTPA claim. Id. at 456-57.
32. Debate on Tex. S.B. 48 on the Floor of the Senate, 64th Leg. 3 (Feb. 10, 1975) (tran-
script available from Senate Staff Services office).
[Vol. 40
COMMERCIAL TORTS
Justice Gonzales concurred in the overall result reached in the case, 33 but
disagreed sharply with the majority's characterization of the plaintiffs as
consumers with standing to sue under the DTPA. In his concurring opinion
he noted that the plaintiffs did not have any rights in the lot used for oil field
pipe storage, but instead had purchased totally distinct lots. As a result, he
believed that the plaintiffs failed to show that the goods or services that they
obtained formed the basis of their DTPA complaint, and he would have
denied them standing to bring a DTPA claim. 34
The supreme court also addressed the consumer issue in Kennedy v.
Sale,35 a case brought by an employee covered under his employer's group
insurance policy. A representative of the insurance carrier met with the
plaintiff and other employees and explained the benefits available under the
policy. The insurer's representative misrepresented the extent of the preex-
isting condition coverage, and the plaintiff claimed that had he been given
correct information regarding the extent of this coverage, he would have
enrolled under his wife's group plan, which provided full coverage. The
court of appeals held that the employee was not a consumer because the
employer alone had purchased the policy and the employee had merely re-
ceived coverage as a benefit of employment. 36 The supreme court reversed,
holding that the first prong of the Cameron test only requires that the plain-
tiff acquire goods or services and does not require that the plaintiff himself
actually make the purchase. 37 The court held that the plaintiff acquired the
policy benefits by purchase, albeit a purchase consummated for his benefit by
his employer; consequently, the plaintiff satisfied the definition of a
consumer.
38
Fielder v. Able39 and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Martin Surgical Co.4°
provide good illustrations of correct and incorrect applications of the Cam-
eron test. The plaintiff-sellers in Fielder brought suit against an attorney
who represented a purchaser in a real estate transaction. The plaintiffs com-
plained that the defendant attorney erroneously included a 75-foot strip of
land within the warranty deed. The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiffs on their DTPA claim, holding that they did not
qualify as consumers. 4' Since the defendant-attorney had not represented
the plaintiffs in the transaction, the plaintiffs had neither sought nor ac-
quired his services. The plaintiffs did acquire a title policy containing the
inaccurate description, and they claimed that the purchase of the policy was
the purchase of a service, which qualified the whole transaction as a con-
33. Although the court found that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue the DTPA claim,
the court found no evidence of unconscionability. See discussion in text accompanying infra
notes 95-96.
34. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 83 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
35. 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985).
36. Sale v. Kennedy, 679 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984).
37. 689 S.W.2d at 892.
38. Id.
39. 680 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
40. 689 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. 680 S.W.2d at 658.
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sumer transaction. The court correctly rejected this argument, noting that
the issuance of the title policy was not the basis of the plaintiff's complaint. 42
As a result, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the second prong of the Cameron
test.
The plaintiff in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Martin Surgical Co.43 had
been one of four defendants in an earlier suit alleging the manufacture or
sale of a defective drug. Martin Surgical had purchased this drug for resale
from the manufacturer and accordingly was covered under a broad form
vendor's endorsement in an insurance policy issued to the manufacturer by
Aetna. Nevertheless, Aetna failed to provide Martin Surgical with a defense
in the earlier lawsuit. As a result, Martin Surgical initiated this DTPA ac-
tion seeking to recover its costs of defending the earlier suit from Aetna.
Under the Cameron test the plaintiff should not have qualified as a con-
sumer. The good or service forming the basis of the plaintiff's complaint was
the insurance policy. The plaintiff neither sought nor acquired this policy,
but instead was a third party beneficiary of a policy acquired by the manu-
facturer.44 Nevertheless, the supreme court held that the plaintiff qualified
as a consumer because the plaintiff purchased goods, in the form of the alleg-
edly defective drugs, as a part of the transaction. 45 Since the allegedly defec-
tive drugs did not form the basis of the plaintiff's complaint against Aetna,
the plaintiff failed to qualify as a consumer under the DTPA according to
the Cameron test, an important point which the court failed to consider.
The court in Northside Auto Storage v. Allstate Insurance Co.4 6 correctly
concluded that the plaintiff did not qualify as a consumer under the Cam-
eron test. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant auto storage company
obtained possession of a stolen car, the rights to which belonged to the plain-
tiff.47 The defendant had stored the car for some time prior to selling it to a
third party. Although the court noted that the storage of the car could con-
stitute a service, the plaintiff had not actually sought or acquired that service
by purchase or lease. As a result, the plaintiff failed to qualify as a consumer
with standing to pursue a DTPA claim. 48
Lenders continue to pose unique problems in determining whether a party
qualifies as a consumer under the DTPA. Since money does not constitute
either a good or a service, the supreme court has held that a party who seeks
to obtain a loan from a bank or other lender does not ordinarily qualify as a
consumer under the DTPA.49 In Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co.50
42. Id. at 657.
43. 689 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. This case is distinguishable from Kennedy v. Sale, discussed supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text, where the insurance company actually issued the policy to the employee,
although the employer paid for the policy.
45. 689 S.W.2d at 267.
46. 684 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
47. The plaintiff insurance company brought a subrogation action after paying its insured
for the value of the stolen automobile. The court treated the company and the insured as
identical parties for purposes of determining the consumer issue.
48. 684 S.W.2d at 187.
49. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1980).
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the supreme court held that a borrower may qualify as a consumer if the
borrower intends to use the money for the purchase or lease of a good or
service. 51 In First Texas Savings Association v. Stiff Properties52 and Irizarry
v. Amarillo Pan Tex Federal Credit Union53 the courts of appeals applied the
Flenniken analysis in order to find that the plaintiffs qualified as consumers.
In Stiff Properties the plaintiff sought a loan from the defendant in order to
purchase a condominium unit. The defendant failed to close the loan at the
agreed time, however, and the plaintiff accordingly could not purchase the
unit. The court held that since the plaintiff intended to purchase a good,
namely the condominium, the plaintiff qualified as a consumer. 54 In so hold-
ing the court neglected to consider the second prong of the Cameron test.
The plaintiff in Stiff Properties had no complaint regarding the condominium
unit that was to be acquired; instead his sole complaint concerned the
lender's failure to loan the money in a timely fashion. Consequently, the
court should not have found that the plaintiff qualified as a consumer under
the Cameron test.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Irizarry sought a loan to acquire an automobile.
The plaintiff claimed that he borrowed the money from the defendant be-
cause the defendant represented to him that the defendant would pay the
loan with the proceeds of an insurance policy carried by the defendant if the
plaintiff became disabled. The plaintiff became disabled and found that the
policy did not cover him. The trial court granted a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, refusing to find that the plaintiff was a consumer.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that since the plaintiff had sought to
purchase a car with the proceeds of the loan, he qualified as a consumer.55
The plaintiffs did not have any complaint regarding the car itself, however.
Thus, the court applied the wrong analysis. Nevertheless, the court reached
the right result because the plaintiff had sought to acquire the disability cov-
erage as a part of the transaction, and his specific complaint concerned this
coverage. Consequently, the plaintiff met both parts of the Cameron test.
In Reed v. Israel National Oil Co. 56 the court held that the determination
of the plaintiffs status as a consumer is a question of law for the trial court
to determine on the basis of the evidence. 57 The court stated that if the trial
court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff is not a consumer, then
the trial court should not submit DTPA issues to the jury.58
Finally, two separate courts of appeals held that a plaintiff does not have
50. 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983); see Hughes, Torts-Commercial, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 35, 41 (1984); Hughes & Gavin, Commercial Torts and Deceptive Trade
Practices, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 123, 133-34 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Hughes & Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey].
51. 661 S.W.2d at 707.
52. 685 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
53. 695 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
54. 685 S.W.2d at 706.
55. 695 S.W.2d at 93.
56. 681 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).




to part with any valuable consideration in order to qualify as a consumer. In
both Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enterprises, Inc. 59 and Reuben H. Donnelly
Corp. v. McKinnon60 the plaintiffs pursued DTPA actions, complaining of
the defendants' failure to place advertisements in the yellow page directory.
The defendants in both cases claimed that the plaintiffs did not qualify as
consumers because they had never been billed for the ads that had not ap-
peared in the directory. Both courts rejected this argument, holding that a
person qualifies as a consumer if he seeks to acquire goods or services, re-
gardless of whether he actually purchases those services.6 1 The court in
Martin established two prerequisites that must be satisfied before a plaintiff
who does not part with any valuable consideration can qualify as a con-
sumer. First, the plaintiff must present himself to the seller as a willing
buyer with the subjective intent or specific objective of purchasing; secondly,
the plaintiff must possess at least some credible indicia of the capacity to
consummate the transaction.62 If a defendant challenges the plaintiff's
status as a consumer, the plaintiff must then offer proof of his good faith
intention to purchase and his capacity to purchase the goods or services in
question.63
B. Notice
In Silva v. Porowski64 the court considered the adequacy of the notice of
the consumer's complaint that the defendant received. 65 Despite the statu-
tory requirement that a plaintiff include a statement of the amount of attor-
ney's fees incurred to the date of the notice, the court held that a party
willing to settle without receiving attorney's fees need not include any refer-
ence to attorney's fees within the notice.66 Since at the time the defendant in
Silva received the notice the plaintiff was willing to waive attorney's fees in
59. 696 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
60. 688 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d at 616; Martin, 696 S.W.2d at 185.
62. 696 S.W.2d at 184-85.
63. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly overruled its earlier decision in Ban-
croft v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 616 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ), which reached a contrary conclusion in a case involving nearly identical facts.
The court based its decision to overrule Bancroft on three separate facts. First, both the legis-
lature and the Texas Supreme Court have acknowledged that courts should liberally construe
the DTPA to protect the public (see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp.
1986)); secondly, the statute itself indicates that the legislature contemplated actionable prac-
tices wherein a transfer of valuable consideration would not always take place (see, e.g., id.
§ 17.46(b)(10) (prohibiting advertising goods or services with intent not to supply a reasonably
expectable public demand)); and thirdly, the supreme court has deemed a person's objective
critical in determining his status as a consumer (citing La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank,
673 S.W.2d 558, 567 (Tex. 1984)). 696 S.W.2d at 183-84.
64. 695 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
65. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides that as a
prerequisite to filing a suit seeking damages under the DTPA, a consumer must give written
notice of his claim to the person he proposes to sue at least thirty days before filing suit. This
notice must advise the person of the consumer's specific complaint and the amount of actual
damages and expenses, including attorneys' fees, if any, reasonably incurred by the consumer
in asserting the claim. Id.
66. 695 S.W.2d at 767-68.
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settling the controversy, the court found the notice adequate. 67 The court
further noted that the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the
giving of notice in a DTPA case. 68 Nevertheless, if a defendant fails to spe-
cially except to a pleading that does not allege the giving of notice, the de-
fendant waives this pleading defect. 69 In Pool Co. v. Salt Grass Exploration,
Inc. 70 the court discussed the proper means of raising a plaintiff's failure to
give proper notice under the DTPA. The defendant in that case maintained
that the court could not sustain the judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his
DTPA cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead and prove the
requisite notice. Consistent with the opinion in Silva, the court held that the
defendant's failure to specially except to the plaintiff's pleadings constituted
a waiver of the pleading defect. 71 The defendant had also waived any objec-
tion to the plaintiff's failure to prove the requisite notice. The court held
that in order to contest a party's right to maintain suit under the DTPA, the
defendant must file a plea in abatement. 72 If the plaintiff has not given the
requisite notice, the court must abate the suit for thirty days. Since the de-
fendant in Pool Co. failed to seek an abatement of the action, the defendant
waived any right to complain on appeal regarding the lack of notice.
In Sunshine Datsun, Inc v. Ramsey73 the defendant's pleading properly
raised the deficiency of the plaintiff's notice, and the court concurred that
the notice given, which failed to include a statement of the actual damages
and attorney's fees being sought, was inadequate. 74 Nevertheless, the court
refused to render a take-nothing judgment based on the consumer's noncom-
pliance with the notice provision. Instead, the court held that the trial court
should have merely abated the suit for the statutory period. 75 To effect this
result after judgment the court remanded the case to the trial court with
orders to abate the suit for a period of time, not to exceed thirty days, during
which, as a condition to litigating her claims, the plaintiff was required to
give the statutory notice.76
C. Substantive Violations
The DTPA authorizes a consumer to maintain an action if any breach of
an express or implied warranty has been a producing cause of actual dam-
ages sustained by the consumer. 77 The Texas Supreme Court in Evans v. J.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 90 (defects in form or substance of a pleading not specifically
pointed out by exception and brought to the attention of the court deemed to have been
waived).
70. 681 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
71. Id. at 219.
72. Id.
73. 680 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
74. Id. at 654.
75. Id. at 655.
76. Id. If the court in this case had applied the same reasoning that was applied in Pool
Co., the court could have ruled that by failing to file a plea in abatement the defendant waived
the complaint regarding lack of notice.
77. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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Stiles, Inc.78 expanded the implied warranties that arise in a case involving a
sale of a newly constructed residence. The plaintiff in Evans recovered a
judgment for breach of an implied warranty based on jury findings that the
defendant did not construct the house in a good and workmanlike manner.
The jury, however, refused to find the house not suitable for human habita-
tion. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that
there could be no breach of an implied warranty in the sale of a new home
absent a finding of uninhabitability. 79 In reversing the judgment of the court
of appeals and affirming that of the trial court, the supreme court held that a
builder-vendor impliedly warrants that a building constructed for residential
use is constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and is suitable for
human habitation.80 Since the implied warranty of construction in a good
and workmanlike manner is totally independent of the implied warranty of
habitability, the court found the violation of the first warranty sufficient to
support a DTPA judgment in favor of the plaintiff.8'
In Thrall v. Renno82 the court held that the defendants who agreed to
install a brick patio for the plaintiff impliedly warranted performance of the
work in a good and workmanlike manner. 83 As a result, the jury's finding
that the defendant failed to install the patio in a good and workmanlike
manner, which was a producing cause of damages to the plaintiff, was suffi-
cient to support a judgment under the DTPA. 84
Determining whether a party's conduct constitutes a breach of warranty
as opposed to mere negligence or a breach of contract often poses difficulty.
In a case decided during last year's survey period,8 5 the Texas Supreme
Court noted that the DTPA does not define the term warranty nor does it
create any warranties.86 Consequently, any warranty must be established
independently of the DTPA. Ordinarily, implied warranties are derived
from statute.8 7 In American Petrofina, Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc.88 the
plaintiff brought a DTPA action, alleging that the defendant failed to deliver
diesel oil that the plaintiff had purchased. The plaintiff claimed that the
contractual provision requiring delivery created an express warranty, or al-
ternatively, that an implied warranty of delivery arose under the Uniform
Commercial Code. The court held that the contractual obligation did not
78. 689 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1985).
79. J. Stiles, Inc. v. Evans, 683 S.W.2d 481, 483-84 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985).
80. 689 S.W.2d at 400; see Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (builder-
vendor impliedly warrants home to be constructed in good workmanlike manner suitable for
habitation).
81. 689 S.W.2d at 400. Although the court held that two separate warranties arise in the
sale of a new home, the first warranty will subsume the second. A home constructed in a good
and workmanlike manner and yet uninhabitable defies imagination.
82. 695 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
83. Id. at 87.
84. Id.
85. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984); see Hughes &
Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 50, at 138.
86. 673 S.W.2d at 565.
87. Id.
88. 679 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ dism'd by agr.).
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rise to the level of an express warranty and further held that the Uniform
Commercial Code does not contain any provisions recognizing an implied
warranty of delivery. 89 Since the court found no breach of any express or
implied warranty, the plaintiff did not prevail in its DTPA claim and was
relegated to its remedies for breach of contract.
The court in David McDavid Pontiac, Inc. v. Nix90 reached a contrary
result under very similar facts. The McDavid court affirmed the jury's find-
ings that the defendant had breached an express warranty when it failed to
deliver a 1979 Pontiac Bonneville with a specific set of optional equipment.9 1
This oral agreement to deliver the described automobile should not have
created any express warranty, just as the written agreement to deliver diesel
oil did not create an express warranty in American Petrofina. Instead, the
court should have found the failure to deliver the goods as agreed upon ac-
tionable solely as a breach of contract.
92
The DTPA also allows a consumer to maintain an action when any un-
conscionable action or course of action by any person has been a producing
cause of actual damages.93 Unconscionable action or course of action in-
cludes acts or practices that take advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability,
experience, or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree, as well as acts
that result in a gross disparity between the value received and consideration
paid in a transaction involving transfer of consideration. 94 In Chastain v.
Koonce95 the Texas Supreme Court established guidelines for determining
whether a plaintiff has established the former type of unconscionable con-
duct. The court concluded that in order to show that he has been taken
advantage of to a grossly unfair degree, a consumer need not show that the
defendant acted intentionally or knowingly to bring about the resulting loss.
Instead, the plaintiff need only show that the unfairness of the transaction
was glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete, and unmitigated.
96
The court in Mytel International, Inc. v. Turbo Refrigerating Co.97 ad-
dressed the second form of unconscionable conduct. The defendant in that
89. The plaintiff sought to rely upon TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312 (Vernon
1968), which creates a warranty in a contract for the sale of goods that the goods shall be
delivered free from any security interest unknown to the buyer. The court held that this did
not create an implied warranty of delivery in the broad sense, but merely warranted that when
the contracting party delivered the goods they would be free from any previously unknown
security interest. 679 S.W.2d at 749.
90. 681 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
91. Id. at 835.
92. The court also based the judgment on the alternative finding that the defendant had
represented to the plaintiff that the car the defendant was to deliver to her would have charac-
teristics or benefits that the car did not have as delivered. This finding, which is a violation of
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1986), sufficed to support the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff independently of the claim for breach of an express warranty.
681 S.W.2d at 835.
93. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
94. Id. § 17.45(5).
95. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 79 (Nov. 27, 1985).
96. Id. at 82. Due to the lack of any evidence that the transaction fit this description, the
court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
97. 689 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
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case sold office supplies to the plaintiff pursuant to a scheme whereby the
plaintiff's purchasing officer received illegal kickbacks. The jury found that
the reasonable value of the goods purchased was $5,266.26, whereas the
purchase price was $11,634.64. The court held this difference between the
amount paid and the value received sufficient to constitute a "gross dispar-
ity" within the meaning of the DTPA.98
Various provisions of the DTPA render misrepresentations in a consumer
transaction actionable. 99 In a case of far-reaching significance the Texas
Supreme Court in Weitzel v. Barnes"'0 held that a plaintiff need not show
reliance upon a misrepresentation in order to prevail in a DTPA action. 101
The plaintiffs in Weitzel purchased a remodeled home from the defendant.
After signing the contract to purchase the home, but before closing, the
plaintiffs attempted to move into the house and discovered a "condemned"
notice nailed on it. Although the contract gave the plaintiffs the right to
inspect the house and terminate the contract if necessary repairs exceeded
$1,000, the plaintiffs elected not to pursue this right. Instead, they moved
into the house and called the city to discuss the matter. Failing to receive
information from the city, the plaintiffs called the defendant, who advised
them that the house met the city code standards. The supreme court held
that the plaintiffs should prevail in their DTPA suit upon establishing that
the defendant's representations were false, without establishing that they
purchased the home in reliance upon those misrepresentations., 02
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Gonzalez queried how a misrepresen-
tation could be a producing cause of a consumer's actual damages if the
consumer did not rely on the misrepresentation. In short, he would have
held the reliance requirement implicit within the need to establish producing
cause. Since the plaintiffs failed to establish that they purchased the house in
reliance upon the alleged misrepresentation, Justice Gonzalez would have
held that plaintiffs did not present evidence of producing cause, and he ac-
cordingly would have rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing., 03
The court of appeals in McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp.1°4 ad-
dressed a very similar question to that considered in Weitzel, although under
98. Id. at 318.
99. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (repre-
senting that goods or services have characteristics that they do not have); id. § 17.46(b)(6)
(representing goods as original or new if used); id. § 17.46(b)(7) (representing goods as of a
particular standard, quality, or grade if they are of another); id. § 17.46(b)(12) (representing
that agreement confers or involves rights which it does not have or involve).
100. 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
101. Id. at 600.
102. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the fact that the 1979 amendments
to the DTPA initially provided that a consumer could maintain an action if he sustained actual
damages as a result of reliance on any of certain enumerated acts. The legislature changed this
language to the present language, which allows the plaintiff to maintain an action upon proof
of a deceptive act that has been a producing cause of actual damages. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The court concluded that this change amounted to
a rejection of reliance as an element of recovery. 691 S.W.2d at 600.
103. 691 S.W.2d at 603.
104. 685 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
[Vol. 40
COMMERCIAL TORTS
the rubric of materiality as opposed to reliance. The plaintiff in McCrea
complained that the roof of a condominium unit purchased from the defend-
ant leaked. He claimed that the defendant had misrepresented the age of the
roof by one year. The court held that the misrepresentation had to be mate-
rial for the plaintiff to recover.' 0 5 The court defined a material fact as one
that causes a party to enter into the transaction. By using this definition, the
court actually required a showing of reliance, a requirement that the
supreme court has now rejected.' 0 6
The DTPA also allows a consumer to maintain a cause of action based
upon a defendant's failure to disclose information concerning goods or serv-
ices known to the defendant at the time of the transaction, but only if the
failure to disclose was intended to, and actually did, induce the consumer to
enter into the transaction. 10 7 In First City Mortgage Co. v. Gillis'0 8 the court
held that as a matter of law the defendant did not have to disclose the fact
that the written contract entered into by the plaintiff differed from the terms
that the plaintiff had requested. 109 The court stated, "It is well settled that
the parties to a contract have an obligation to protect themselves by reading
what they sign. Unless there is some basis for finding fraud, the parties may
not excuse themselves from the consequences of failing to meet that
obligation." 110
Courts still have difficulty in determining under what circumstances par-
ties can maintain a DTPA action on the theory that the defendant repre-
sented that an agreement conferred or involved rights that the agreement did
not involve.11' In William P. Terrell, Inc. v. Miller" 12 the plaintiff-purchaser
brought suit against the defendant-seller, alleging that the defendant had
agreed to pay $1,600 toward the points charged by the lender, but refused to
do so. The defendant maintained that the plaintiff's claim alleged breach of
contract and not a DTPA violation. The court, without analysis, concluded
that the failure to pay the points was a violation of section 17.46(b)(12). 113
105. Id. at 759 (citing Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980)).
106. The court held that plaintiff presented no evidence to link the age of the roof to the
leaks. Consequently, the court found no evidence that the misrepresentation was a producing
cause of the plaintiff's loss. Under the court's definition of materiality, the plaintiff in McCrea
would also have to have established that the misrepresentations made regarding the age of the
roof induced him to purchase the condominium in the first place. 685 S.W.2d at 759.
107. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
108. 694 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. Id. at 146. The plaintiff in Gillis hired the defendant as a broker to obtain permanent
financing for a manufacturing plant. In completing the standard application for financing the
plaintiff made a request to vary the loan amortization and prepayment provisions contained in
the application. The loan commitment did not incorporate these requested changes, and the
defendant broker did not disclose this fact to the plaintiff.
110. Id. at 147.
111. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1986); see Hughes &
Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 50, at 136-37.
112. 697 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
113. Id. at 457. The court's erroneous conclusion would turn every breach of contract case
into a DTPA claim. Any time a party fails to perform a contractual obligation, the opposing
party could claim that the agreement did not contain the rights that the parties anticipated.
See Hughes & Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 50, at 136-37.
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D. Actions Against Insurance Companies
When determining whether a plaintiff may maintain a DTPA action
against an insurance company, one cannot consider the DTPA in a vacuum.
Instead, a consideration of the interaction of the DTPA with the appropriate
provisions of the Insurance Code is required. Under article 21.21 of the
Insurance Code, 114 any person who sustains actual damages as a result of
any practice defined by section 17.46 of the DTPA as an unlawful deceptive
trade practice may maintain an action against the insurance company that
engaged in such practice. Although the relief available under article 21.21
nearly mirrors that provided under the DTPA, 15 the case of Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Kelly 1 6 points out other advantages to pursuing an article 21.21
claim. The court noted that section 16 of article 21.21 allows a party to seek
recovery from an insurance company engaging in any false, misleading, or
deceptive acts or practices, regardless of whether the DTPA specifically enu-
merates those acts. 7 Consequently, the types of conduct that may give rise
to a claim for treble damages expand when the defendant is an insurance
company.
In Allstate the plaintiff challenged the defendant insurance company's fail-
ure to accept a settlement proposal within the insured's policy limits. A
previous case involving an automobile accident had named Alves, the in-
sured, a defendant under circumstances that clearly established his liability.
The plaintiff in that case had offered to settle the case for $50,000, the
amount of Alves' insurance coverage. When the insurance company refused
to settle, the plaintiff pursued the case to a judgment in excess of $500,000.
As a result, Alves" 8 pursued a Stowers1 19 action for the insurance com-
pany's negligent failure to accept the settlement proposal. In addition, the
plaintiff alleged a violation of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. It was
undisputed that the defendant insurance company knew that the claim
against its insured presented serious exposure. Nevertheless, the company's
114. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
115. Id. § 16(b) (providing for actual damages, court costs, attorneys' fees, plus additional
damages of up to two times the actual damages if defendant acted knowingly; only difference
from DTPA is failure to include mandatory trebling of first $1,000 damages).
116. 680 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. Id. at 605. Prior to the 1979 amendments of the DTPA, a consumer could maintain
an action against any person who engaged in any false, misleading, or deceptive acts or prac-
tices. Under the 1979 amendments, however, a consumer can maintain a private action for
relief only if the defendant engaged in one of the twenty-three acts specifically prohibited by
§ 17.46(b) of the DTPA, commonly referred to as the "laundry list." See Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, ch. 603, § 4, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 603. In holding that § 16 of article 21.21
allows for actions against insurance companies for deceptive acts not contained in the"laundry
list," the Allstate court disapproved of the contrary statement set forth in Mobile County Ins.
Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 566
S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1978). 680 S.W.2d at 605.
118. Alves assigned two-thirds of his claim to Kelly, the plaintiff in the lawsuit in which
the court awarded the $500,000 judgment.
119. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n. App. 1929, holding approved). A Stowers action arises when a plaintiff sues his
insurer for the insurer's failure to settle a lawsuit against the plaintiff for an amount within the
limits of the plaintiff's insurance policy.
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representatives failed to inform Alves of their evaluation of the plaintiff's
claim, of her offer to settle within policy limits, or of the risk to Alves if he
did not accept the offer of settlement. The jury found that this failure to
inform constituted an unconscionable course of action and was a false, mis-
leading, and deceptive practice, which proximately caused the entry of the
judgment against Alves. Based on these findings the court entered judgment
against the company for actual damages of $582,413.12, representing the
amount of the judgment in the case against Alves along with post-judgment
interest accrued as of the time of the DTPA suit, and $1,164,826.24 as addi-
tional damages. ' 20
Allstate cited Rosell v. Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. 121 for
the proposition that the DTPA does not confer a cause of action in a Stowers
case. 122 The court rejected the reasoning of the court in Rosell, holding that
a plaintiff can maintain a Stowers action under the DTPA if the jury finds
that the insurance company's conduct constituted false, misleading, or de-
ceptive acts or practices, as required by section 17.46(a) of the DTPA. 123
The Kelly decision allows a plaintiff great latitude in alleging potentially
false, misleading, or deceptive acts in a suit against an insurance company
under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.
Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vail 124 presented an issue in
many ways the converse of the issue considered in the Kelly case. 125 DTPA
section 17.50126 authorizes a consumer to maintain a DTPA action where
the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of
rules or regulations issued by the State Board of Insurance under article
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code constitutes a producing cause of actual
damages. The plaintiff in Vail attempted to bring a DTPA action based on
alleged unfair claim settlement practices engaged in by the defendant. The
plaintiff contended that section 4(a) of the regulations promulgated by the
State Board of Insurance required an insurance company to attempt in good
faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which
liability is reasonably clear. Relying upon section 17.50(a)(4),1 27 the plaintiff
filed an action under the DTPA based on a violation of this regulation. The
court rejected this argument, holding that the regulation originated under
article 21.21-2 of the Texas Insurance Code, 12 8 which does not confer a pri-
vate right for unfair claim settlement practices.' 29 Instead, that article only
authorizes the State Board of Insurance to stop such unlawful practices by
120. 680 S.W.2d at 598-99.
121. 642 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
122. 680 S.W.2d at 602.
123. Id. at 603; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
124. 695 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
125. In Kelly the plaintiff sought to maintain an action under the Insurance Code for a
violation of the DTPA, whereas in Vail the plaintiff sought to maintain an action under the
DTPA for a violation of insurance rules and regulations.
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
127. Id.
128. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981).
129. 695 S.W.2d at 694.
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issuing a cease and desist order. 1 30 Since no private cause of action was
available under that article, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to "back-
door" his way into a private cause of action by relying upon regulations that
merely restated the statutory provisions. As a result, the court reversed the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff awarding damages under the DTPA and
reformed the judgment to award only damages for breach of contract.'13
E. Defenses and the Anti- Waiver Provision
In Weitzel v. Barnes 32 the plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase a
remodeled home from the defendant. The plaintiff maintained that the de-
fendant made certain oral misrepresentations, and the defendant asserted the
parol evidence rule as a defense. 133 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this
defense, holding misrepresentations actionable under the DTPA regardless
of whether they conflict with the parties' written agreement. 34 The court
noted that the parol evidence rule only prohibits parties from relying upon
inconsistent oral representations in support of a breach of contract claim. 1
35
Since the remedies provided under the DTPA are expressly cumulative with
other available remedies,' 36 such as the remedies provided for breach of con-
tract, the oral misrepresentations could constitute the basis of a DTPA cause
of action even though they did not support a contract claim.
137
In several cases decided during the survey period defendants sought to
rely upon contractual provisions limiting the remedies available to the plain-
tiff or waiving entirely any express or implied warranties in the transaction.
The plaintiffs in those cases responded by citing section 17.42,138 which pro-
vides that a consumer's waiver of the DTPA provisions is unenforceable and
void.139 In McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp.14° the plaintiff brought
suit under the DTPA, alleging defects in a condominium purchased from the
defendant. The defendant relied upon a contractual provision disclaiming
all express and implied warranties. The court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the disclaimer was unenforceable due to the provisions of section
17.42, citing G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux,14 1 a DTPA case in which the
130. See Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981).
131. 695 S.W.2d at 695.
132. 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
133. The parol evidence rule operates in some situations to forbid a party from offering
evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements to contradict or vary the terms of a
written contract. Distributors Inventory Co. v. Patton, 130 Tex. 449, 451-52, 110 S.W.2d 47,
48 (1937).
134. 691 S.W.2d at 600.
135. Id.
136. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
137. Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 599-600.
138. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
139. Section 17.42 allows for waivers in cases involving a business consumer with assets of
$5 million or more and sufficient knowledge and experience to enable it to evaluate the merits
and risks of a transaction, provided that the business consumer does not appear in a signifi-
cantly disparate bargaining position. Id.
140. 685 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
141. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
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supreme court enforced a disclaimer of implied warranties. The court in
McCrea concluded that "when a contract specifically states that no express
or implied warranties are made, a cause of action for breach of express or
implied warranties under either the DTPA or contract law has been waived,
unless such provisions are against public policy or some other statutory
provision." 42
In Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Industries, Inc. 143 the court noted
that a contractual limitation on the amount of damages recoverable' 44
would arguably be enforceable in either a breach of contract case or a DTPA
breach of warranty case. 145 The provisions of section 17.42 do render the
limitation unenforceable as regards a misrepresentation claim under the
DTPA, however. 146
In Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enterprises, Inc.'47 the court questioned the use
of the Robichaux opinion as authority. The court noted that in Robichaux
the supreme court did not discuss the anti-waiver provision of the DTPA.
Consequently, the court deemed the opinion not controlling and held that
section 17.42 would nullify a limitation of liability clause or any other clause
amounting to a waiver of the DTPA's protections.' 48 The Martin opinion
does not indicate whether the plaintiff pursued a claim for alleged misrepre-
sentations or for breach of express or implied warranties. Whether the Mar-
tin opinion conflicts with the approach taken in Reliance is, consequently,
unclear.
Finally, in Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck 49 the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant had misrepresented the characteristics, uses, or benefits of the equipment
that the plaintiff purchased. The plaintiff relied upon statements contained
in a brochure. The defendant argued that the plaintiff could not maintain an
action based on any misrepresentation in the brochure because it expressly
stated that the specifications contained therein were merely the latest infor-
mation available and because the defendant reserved the right to make any
changes at any time. The court held that to allow the defendants to rely
upon this provision as a defense to the plaintiff's DTPA action would be
tantamount to enforcing a contractual provision waiving the remedies pro-
vided under the DTPA.150 Relying upon section 17.42, the court refused to
give effect to this disclaimer.' 51 For the same reason the court also refused
to enforce contractual provisions limiting the remedies available to the plain-
142. 685 S.W.2d at 758; see also Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Systems, Inc., 665
S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (court rejected plaintiff's contention that
DTPA renders any disclaimer of remedies unenforcable and void).
143. 688 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719 (Vernon 1968).
145. 688 S.W.2d at 892-93.
146. Id.
147. 696 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. Id. at 186.
149. 690 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, no writ).




tiff and purporting to set a liquidated damage figure.' 5 2
F Relief Available Under the DTPA
In Leyendecker & Associates, Inc. v. Wechter'5 3 the Texas Supreme Court
analyzed the potential damages recoverable by a plaintiff who prevails in a
DTPA cause of action. The plaintiff in that case purchased a townhouse
from the defendant and alleged that the defendant had misrepresented the
size of the townhouse lot. The court noted that common law allows an in-
jured party to recover actual damages measured by the difference between
the value of that with which he has parted and the value of that which he has
received, more commonly referred to as the out-of-pocket measure of dam-
ages.154 Under certain circumstances Texas courts have allowed a party to
recover the benefit of his bargain, which allows the plaintiff to recover the
difference between the value of the good purchased as represented and the
value as received. ' 55 In keeping with an earlier decision of the Waco court of
appeals,' 56 the court held that a plaintiff under the DTPA may recover
either out-of-pocket damages or benefit-of-the-bargain damages, whichever
gives the consumer the greater recovery.157
In David McDavid Pontiac, Inc. v. Nix1" the plaintiff sought rescission
under the DTPA. The plaintiff purchased an automobile that did not have
all of the equipment that the defendant represented it would have. The
court held that before the plaintiff could avail herself of the right of rescis-
sion, she must offer to return the property she had received and the value of
any benefit derived from its possession.159 Since the plaintiff had driven the
automobile for one month, travelling some 1,200 miles, the court held that
she could only obtain rescission if she offered to pay to the defendant the
value of the use of the automobile for this period. Since the plaintiff made no
such offer, she could not receive rescission. 60 The plaintiff in Nix also
sought injunctive relief under section 17.50(b)(2) of the DTPA.' 6' The
court deemed the grant of injunctive relief to a prevailing consumer as dis-
cretionary with the trial court.' 62 Furthermore, absent evidence that the
acts sought to be enjoined were occurring or were likely to occur to other
152. Id. at 923-24.
153. 683 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1984).
154. Id. at 373.
155. Id.
156. Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
157. 683 S.W.2d at 373; see also Cheek v. Zalta, 693 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (court of appeals approved of trial court's use of "benefit of the
bargain" measure of damages); Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McGlashan, 681 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (benefit of the bargain measure approved, and court
held that purchase price was evidence of the market value of the good if it had been as
represented).
158. 681 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. Id. at 836.
160. Id.
161. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (consumer who
prevails under DTPA may obtain order enjoining such acts or failure to act).
162. 681 S.W.2d at 839.
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consumers, a permanent injunction forbidding those acts would be im-
proper. 163 In Kish v. Van Note 6 4 the Texas Supreme Court described recov-
ery under the DTPA as cumulative rather than mutually exclusive of other
available remedies. 165 The court accordingly allowed the plaintiff to recover
under both the DTPA and the Texas Consumer Credit Code. 166
The amount of additional damages recoverable under the DTPA was ad-
dressed by the supreme court in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia.167 The
DTPA states that a consumer who prevails under the DTPA may recover
two times the portion of the actual damages not exceeding $1,000, and if the
trier of fact finds that the defendant committed the acts in question know-
ingly, the trier of fact may also award not more than three times the amount
of actual damages in excess of $1,000.168 Prior to the supreme court's opin-
ion in Valencia, lower courts differed as to whether this provision allowed a
jury to award, as additional damages, three times the amount of the plain-
tiff's actual damages, which would result in quadrupling the plaintiff's recov-
ery. The court in Valencia held that the maximum a plaintiff may recover is
three times the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff.' 69 Consequently,
the trier of fact cannot award more than two times the amount of the plain-
tiff's actual damages as additional damages under the DTPA.170
III. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
During the survey period employers' rights with respect to the termination
of employees-at-will continued to deteriorate. The enforcement of covenants
restricting the post-employment activities of a former employee experienced
a similar decline. Unfortunately for employers, no change in this trend ap-
pears likely.
Undoubtedly the most important decision in this area during the survey
period, and probably the most widely discussed decision of the Texas
Supreme Court in the last year, is Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck.17 1 In
this case the plaintiff brought an action for wrongful discharge after the
plaintiff's employer terminated his employment because he refused to per-
form an unlawful act. 172 The court of appeals reversed a summary judgment
163. Id.
164. 692 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985).
165. Id. at 467; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (provi-
sions of DTPA not exclusive, and remedies provided in subchapter are in addition to other
remedies provided in other laws); supra text accompanying note 105.
166. 692 S.W.2d at 467; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.01 to .07 (Vernon
1971 & Supp. 1986).
167. 690 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1985).
168. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
169. 690 S.W.2d at 241.
170. Id.; see also Jasso v. Duron, 681 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court examined legislative history of § 17.50(b)(1) and held that section does
not allow for quadrupling of damages).
171. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).




in the employer's favor, 17 3 and the supreme court affirmed the reversal. 174
The court stated that public policy requires a "very narrow exception" to the
employment-at-will doctrine.1 75 The narrow exception covers "only the dis-
charge of an employee for the sole reason that the employee refused to per-
form an illegal act."' 176
Despite the effort of the supreme court to narrowly circumscribe its hold-
ing in Sabine Pilot Service,177 now that the public policy exception has
gained its toehold in the employment-at-will doctrine, it may prove difficult
for the courts not to gradually expand the exception. For example, the pub-
lic policy argument does not seem significantly stronger in Sabine Pilot Ser-
vice than in Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc.178 in which the defendant
allegedly fired the plaintiff-nurse because she complained to her superiors
about poor care and negligent treatment of patients in a nursing home.
179
Arguably, public policy should also have protected the plaintiff in Currey v.
Lone Star Steel Co., 180 who was terminated because he filed a lawsuit to
recover monies the employer owed him. If the strict employment-at-will
doctrine was a harsh rule at times, the doctrine at least offered certainty. A
gradual case-by-case broadening of the exceptions to the doctrine is undesir-
able. The legislature should take action to consolidate the existing statutory
exceptions' 8' to the doctrine and define the scope of any public policy
exceptions.
The benefits employers may gain from restrictive covenants in an employ-
ment contract with their employees have also lessened in the past few
years.' 82 Three cases decided by the Fifth Circuit during the survey period
evidence the continuation of that trend. In Tandy Brands, Inc. v. Harper'8 3
the court refused to "red-line" an overly broad covenant where the only
relief sought was damages for the breach of the covenant. In NCH Corp. v.
Share Corp.184 and Hi-Line Electric Co. v. Dowco Electrical Products85 the
court held that an employer does not have a cause of action against its for-
173. 672 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984); see Hughes & Gavin, 1985 An-
nual Survey, supra note 50, at 132-33.




178. 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
179. See also Jones v. Memorial Hosp. System, 677 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, no writ) (nurse's critical article regarding patient treatment was constitutionally
protected speech).
180. 676 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
181. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1986) (discharge for
filing worker's compensation claims); id. art. 5207a (Vernon 1986) (discharge based on union
membership or nonmembership); id. art. 5765 (Vernon 1986) (discharge based on active duty
in state military forces); id. art. 5765 (Vernon 1986) (discharge based on active duty in state
military forces); id. art. 5207b (Vernon Supp. 1986) (discharge because of jury service); id. art.
5221k, § 1.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (discharge based upon discrimination).
182. See Hughes & Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 50, at 130-32. But see Gill v.
Guy Chapman Co., 681 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
183. 760 F.2d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1985).
184. 757 F.2d 1540, 1542 (5th Cir. 1985).
185. 765 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1985).
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mer employee's new employer for inducing a breach of the employee's re-
strictive covenant if the covenant is overly broad and, therefore,
unenforceable against the employee.' 8 6
IV. LIBEL
In an action for libel the long-held view has been that "the truth is an
absolute defense."' 8 7 Recent cases raise a question, however, as to whether
truth is a defense or whether plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity as an
essential element of his case. Three cases decided during the survey period
illustrate the recent split of authority. In Cranberg v. Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc.,188 the Fifth Circuit assumed without substantial discussion that
the plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of an allegedly libelous
statement in order to recover.1 89 In the very next sentence of the opinion,
however, the court repeats the refrain that "substantial truth is a defense to a
libel claim."' 90 The court cited as authority cases that place the burden of
proving the truth of the statement upon the defendant. 91
Two Texas appellate decisions have directly faced the burden of proof
issue and reached opposite conclusions. In Outlet Co. v. International Secur-
ity Group, Inc. ' 92 the court expressly held that the burden is on the plaintiff
to prove the falsity of the statements rather than upon the defendant to
prove their truth. 193 The court cited as authority A.H. Belo Corp. v.
Rayzor.194 Conversely, in Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck 195 the court held
that truth of defamatory statements ia an affirmative defense and the burden
of proving truth by a preponderance of the evidence should rest upon the
defendant. 196 The court considered and rejected A.H. Belo Corp. 197 and two
earlier decisions 98 that seem to place the burden of proving falsity on the
plaintiff. The court stated: "In our opinion the cases relied on by appellant
do not support appellant's contention that Texas law has changed so as to
now place on a private defamation plaintiff the burden of proving falsity of
the defamatory statements in order to recover damages for libel and slan-
der." 199 The Texas Supreme Court should resolve this split of authority at
186. The holding in NCH Corp. and Hi-Line Electric have ramifications beyond the em-
ployer-employee context. See infra text accompanying notes 227-30.
187. 36 TEX. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 52 (1962).
188. 756 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1985).
189. Id. at 390.
190. Id.
191. Gulf Constr. Co. v. Mott, 442 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1969, no writ); Walker v. Globe News Publishing Co., 395 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
192. 693 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. Id. at 627.
194. 644 S.W.2d 71, 80 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
196. Id. at 623.
197. 644 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
198. Borden, Inc. v. Wallace, 570 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ
dism'd); Roegelein Provision Co. v. Mayen, 566 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).




Two decisions highlight a defendant's difficulty in obtaining summary
judgment in a libel action in Which actual malice is an issue. In Beaumont
Enterprise & Journal v. Smith2° ° the plaintiff held public office and, there-
fore, had to show actual malice in his libel action against the defendant pub-
lisher. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the defendant,
which the court of appeals reversed. 20 1  In affirming the reversal, the
supreme court noted that for summary judgment purposes the burden rested
on the defendant to show the absence of actual malice.20 2 The defendant
had submitted the author's affidavit as to her own state of mind with respect
to the article's preparation. The court held, however, that an affidavit as to
the affiant's own state of mind does not constitute evidence that will support
a summary judgment. 20 3 Two judges dissented, describing the record as "re-
plete with evidence" that the author had not prepared the article with actual
malice and noting that the record contained no evidence of actual malice.20 4
The Dallas court of appeals also reversed a summary judgment in Goodman
v. Gallerano20 5 on the basis of the same reasoning. The court stated that the
affidavits of the authors of the statement in issue constituted nothing more
than uncontroverted testimony of interested witnesses and as such simply
raised a fact issue as to the witnesses' credibility. 20 6
The scope and application of absolute and qualified privileges continue to
present fertile fields for judicial review. In the Goodman case discussed
above the defendants made an allegedly defamatory statement to university
officials who were charged with considering the plaintiff for tenure as a full
professor. The defendants argued that the statements were absolutely privi-
leged, but the court held that the process of reviewing for tenure does not fall
within the "traditional areas" to which an absolute privilege applies.2 0 7 In
Levingston Shipbuilding Co. v. Inland West Corp.20 8 the appellate court af-
firmed an award on the basis of the defendant's assertion of unsupportable
claims in a lawsuit and subsequent distribution of the pleading to the news
media. The court recognized the privileged nature of statements in the judi-
cial process, but held that there are limitations upon this privilege and that
the defendant by its actions had "stepped out of the umbrella of
200. 687 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1985).
201. 677 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ).
202. 687 S.W. 2d at 730.
203. Id. at 730-31.
204. Id. at 731 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
205. 695 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
206. Id. at 287-88.
207. Id. at 287; cf Astro Resources Corp. v. Ionics, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 446, 447-48 (S.D.
Tex. 1983) (in Texas, an absolute privilege attaches to statements made in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings); Odeneal v. Wofford, 668 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ
refd n.r.e.) (absolute privilege attaches to statements made before the State Bar Grievance
Committee). The courts in both cases held that the proceedings were quasi-judicial, and thus
absolutely privileged, when the person to whom the statement was made had the authority to
investigate the statement and make decisions based upon that investigation.




In Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar2 10 the court discussed the qualified privi-
lege that attaches to statements by an employer about an employee to an-
other person "having a corresponding interest or duty in the matter to which
the communication relates" 21' as well as the absolute privilege attaching to
judicial proceedings. The plaintiffs employer had made a complaint to a
justice of the peace in which the employer asserted that the plaintiff had
stolen some of the employer's property. The court held such statements
subject only to a qualified privilege; thus they may form the basis for liability
if made with malice.21 2 The correctness of this holding seems doubtful. The
court declined to follow the established rule that statements made in the
course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged. Instead, the court
elected to follow the case of Zarate v. Cortinas,21 3 which concluded that the
"better reasoned rule" is that statements communicating a charge of com-
mitting a wrongful act should carry only a qualified privilege. 21 4 Strong pol-
icy considerations favor an absolute privilege upon such communications;
nothing should chill the reporting of conduct believed unlawful. False re-
ports maliciously made will give rise to a claim of malicious prosecution.
The Fifth Circuit applied a qualified privilege in Seidenstein v. National
Medical Enterprises, Inc. 215 to the remarks of one doctor to a group of other
physicians practicing in the same hospital regarding the reasons that the hos-
pital had denied staff privileges to the plaintiff.21 6 The court held such state-
ments conditionally privileged as occurring "under circumstances wherein
any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject
matter may reasonably believe that facts exist which another, sharing that
common interest, is entitled to know."'2 17 By reason of conditional privilege,
the plaintiff was required to show actual malice. The appellate court re-
versed the jury finding of malice on the ground that the plaintiff offered no
evidence that the speaker did not believe that the statement was true.21 8
V. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL AND BUSINESS RELATIONS
As discussed in last year's survey article, 21 9 the development of the law
with respect to this tort remains unclear, and the cases decided in the past
year do little to help. Nevertheless, several cases merit attention. State Na-
209. Id. at 196-97. A question remains as to whether the court based the award upon the
claim of libel or the claim of "abuse of process," which the plaintiff also asserted.
210. 682 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
211. Id. at 630 (quoting Bergman v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 814, 816
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ)).
212. 682 S.W.2d at 631.
213. 553 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
214. Id. at 655.
215. 769 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1985).
216. The reasons were described as "of such a grave ethical and moral nature that they
could not be disclosed." Id. at 1103.
217. Id. (quoting from cases cited therein).
218. Id. at 1105. Judge Williams wrote a vigorous dissent in support of the jury verdict.
Id. at 1107.
219. Hughes & Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 50, at 127.
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tional Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 220 may prove particularly signifi-
cant if followed or expanded by later decisions. In a complex fact situation,
the plaintiff alleged that its lender banks had engaged in a series of improper
actions that interfered with the internal business activities of the plaintiff
corporation. The plaintiff broadly alleged a tort of interference. The court
of appeals discussed the claim in the context of the tort of interference with
contractual or business relations. 221 The defendant argued that the plaintiff
showed no evidence of interference with an existing or reasonably probable
future contract or business relation with a third party. Indeed, the plaintiffs
complaint alleged that the lenders had interfered with its internal affairs-
notably, its election of officers and directors.
The appellate court admitted that interference has traditionally involved
the plaintiffs relations with third parties. 222 Nevertheless, the court held
that the evidence sufficiently showed that the lenders had interfered without
justification in plaintiff's "business relations, election of directors and officers
and its protected rights."' 223 Accordingly, the court concluded that as a
matter of law the plaintiff had established a cause of action for interfer-
ence. 224 The opinion in State National Bank was neither reasoned clearly
nor did it correctly state the law. Nevertheless, the opinion remains, 225 and
a creative plaintiff may take advantage of the court's loose reasoning to craft
a new or vastly expanded tort of interference with business relations in cases
not involving contracts or relations with third parties but only the plaintiff's
internal affairs.
Several cases presented the question of what type of contract the law pro-
tects from interference. As previously discussed 226 the Fifth Circuit held in
NCH Corp. v. Share Corp.,22 7 and Hi-Line Electrical Products v. Dowco Elec-
trical Products,228 that no cause of action exists for interference with a con-
tractual provision limiting an employee's post-employment activities if the
court holds the provision overly broad and therefore unenforceable. 229 The
Fifth Circuit distinguished the issue from the instances in which the contract
at issue may be unenforceable because of other reasons (such as the statute of
frauds) on the grounds of the strong public policy that disfavors agreements
that limit a person's right to employment. 230 In Deauville Corp. v. Federated
Department Stores, Inc.23 1 the Fifth Circuit also held that plaintiffs can
maintain an action based on interference with an at-will contract. 232 Practi-
220. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ dism'd by agr.).
221. Id. at 688.
222. Id. at 690.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. The parties settled during the pendency of the application for writ of error, so the
appellate decision will stand.
226. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
227. 757 F.2d 1540 (5th Cir. 1985).
228. 765 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1985).
229. Id. at 1362.
230. Id.
231. 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985).
232. Id. at 1195.
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tioners should read the holding in Deauville with caution, however, given the
holding of the same court in C.E. Services, Inc. v. Control Data Corp.
2 3 3
There the court noted, "A third-party's efforts to induce another to exercise
his right to dissolve a contract at will or to terminate contractual relations
on notice does not constitute tortious interference with contract under Texas
law."'234 The court attempted unconvincingly to distinguish Deauville,235
but the two cases appear to conflict.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Texas "Lemon Law"
In Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Commission,236 the Fifth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of the Texas "lemon law."'237 The statute grants
to purchasers of automobiles certain administrative remedies against manu-
facturers before the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission.
B. Indemnity Agreements
Texas courts will enforce agreements by which one party agrees to indem-
nify another party for the loss caused by the negligence of the indemnified
party only if the agreement is clear and unequivocal. 238 For the careful
draftsman, this means that the indemnification agreement should expressly
state that the agreement protects the indemnified party from the conse-
quences of his own negligence. The Fifth Circuit held in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Burlington Northern Railroad239 that the court will interpret a startlingly
broad indemnification provision 240 to protect the indemnified party from the
loss caused by its own negligence. 241 Though the provision made no refer-
ence to whether the indemnified party could look to the agreement to re-
cover for a loss occasioned by its own negligence, the court held that because
the indemnitor agreed to be responsible for all losses "incident to" the activ-
ity in question, the indemnitor had fair notice that it could be liable for a loss
resulting solely from the negligence of the opposite contracting party.2 4 2 The
233. 759 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1985).
234. Id. at 1248 (citing Claus v. Gyorkey, 674 F.2d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 1982); Kingsberry v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 315 S.W.2d 561, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1958, writ refd n.r.e.).
235. 759 F.2d at 1249 n.11.
236. 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
237. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
238. See Haywood v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 708 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1983);
McClane v. Sun Oil Co., 634 F.2d 855, 858 (5th Cir.1981); Chevron Oil Co. v. E.D. Walton
Constr. Co., 517 F.2d 1119, 1121 (5th Cir. 1975); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Exxon Corp., 603
S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1980); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490
S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1972); Joe Adams & Son v. McCann Constr. Co., 475 S.W.2d 721, 723
(Tex. 1971).
239. 751 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1985).
240. "[Defendant] ... hereby assumes all responsibility and liability for, and expressly
covenants and agrees to protect, indemnify and save harmless [Plaintiff] from and against any
and all loss... of or damage to property whatsoever, in any manner caused by, resulting from or
incident to storage of private cars on said track . Id. at 747-48 (emphasis by the court).
241. Id. at 748.
242. Id. at 749.
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Fifth Circuit gave the contractual provision a more generous reading than
would have been given by a Texas court.
C. Conversion Remedy
In Storms v. Reid24 3 the defendant spent approximately $18,000 on im-
provements to a house that he thought he had purchased but which in fact
belonged to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff saw the improvements to the
house he demanded that the defendant pay him for the house. The defend-
ant refused and the plaintiff brought an action for conversion. The plaintiff
prevailed on the conversion claim and elected to recover possession of the
property rather than money damages. The trial court denied the election
and limited the plaintiff to the recovery of the fair market value of the house
at the time and place of the conversion (which was approximately $1200).
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that an equitable exception exists to
the plaintiff's right to recover converted property if such recovery results in a
windfall to the plaintiff.244 Hopefully, courts will limit the Storms decision
to its facts. 245 A broad application of the exception would remove a signifi-
cant risk to a party who knowingly converts the property of another.
D. Duress
The extensive opinion of the El Paso appellate court in State National
Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 246 contains a discussion of a broad array
of tort claims, some previously mentioned.247 The opinion merits attention
for its discussion of the duress claim that the plaintiff asserted against its
lender banks. The court first defined duress as a recognizable tort for which
a plaintiff may recover and not merely a defensive issue. 248 The court found
that the lending banks had used the threat of declaring the plaintiff's loan in
default to prevent the election of a particular director. 249 The court then
proceeded systematically to reject each of the banks' arguments as to why
the plaintiff did not prove the elements of duress. 250 Finally, the court ap-
peared to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the same measure of
damages, including lost profits, as would be recoverable for the fraud claims
asserted by the plaintiff.25' The court's opinion is highly fact-intensive, and
the court's reasoning is far from clear or sound in many respects; neverthe-
less, counsel involved in commercial tort litigation will want to review this
opinion.
243. 691 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
244. Id. at 75.
245. The court noted that the plaintiff had virtually abandoned the house for two years
prior to discovering the improvements made by the defendant.
246. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ dism'd by agr.).
247. See text accompanying supra notes 220-25.
248. 678 S.W.2d at 685-86. The court cited Housing Authority v. Hubbell, 325 S.W.2d
880, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.), as the only prior Texas case to dis-
cuss the point and as support for the conclusion that duress constitutes a tort.
249. 678 S.W.2d at 686.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 698.
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